The U.S. Air accident investigation branch, NTSB, have stated that in June 2007 another MD aircraft on a flight from Lanzarote, suffered a string of failures “similar” to that of the Spanair aircraft that crashed at Barajas in 2008.

In a note issued on Monday after the Spanish report on the accident in Barajas which confirms that the aircraft took off without flaps and no warning alarm sounded due to an electrical fault, strong similarities can be drawn from theprevious incident in 2007.

In the 2007 case, the crew managed to take off as the MD-83 aircraft is more powerful than the doomed MD-82, and they were flying into strong head winds which increased the lift of the aircraft in what could be described as a very lucky escape for all those on board.

The NTSB, in a seven-page note in which it puts in place three of the seven recommendations of Spanish investigation to prevent accidents, said: “The CIAIAC is also investigating an incident similar to the crash of Spanair. On June 5 of 2007, a Boeing MD-83 registered as OE-LMM, and chartered by the company Mapjet made a takeoff without flaps extended at the airport of Lanzarote. The black boxes and statements of the pilots during take off indicate that the take off was made without the correct configuration, and that no warning system sounded from the TOWS (Take Off Warning System)”. This string of circumstances is almost identical to the situation in Madrid.

The NSTB knows what happened in both events and has access to the official investigation, as the manufacturer of the aircraft (Mc Donnell Douglas, later acquired by Boeing) is an American company. In addition, in 1987, a Boeing MD-82 crashed in Detroit, with almost identical factors to those in these two incidents. Only a 4 year old girl survived, 154 people were killed and the incident was investigated by the NTSB.

The Lanzarote MD-83 was hired by Air Comet, with 140 passengers on board. The take off was conducted without flaps (poorly configured) and no alarm sounded due to an electrical fault. As in the Barajas disaster, although the electrical problem could be different, Lanzarote technicians had removed a fuse (the K-33) in a routine review a fuse which the CIAIAC indicate caused a failure in the warning system.

The outcome in both cases are similar. Both aircraft reported overheating problems which resulted in inactivating the alarm system which then failed to report the misconfiguration on take off. The Mapjet plane had problems with the temperature probe in the days prior to the incident, the Spanair aircraft, up to six times in the three days prior to the incident.

And yet, there were differences that saved the aircraft from of Lanzarote. The MD-83 is more powerful than the MD-82, had a strong head wind and the airport is at sea level (as opposed to the Barajas). These factors allowed the crew to lift the flight clear of the runway, although it did come close to colliding with a car dealership. Moreover, in the Barajas incident, before applying the maximum power, the right engine was stopped as the crew believed they had a failed turbine, which is what they thought was the cause of the bad take off.

Despite the similarities, the CIAIAC investigation does not mention the incident at Lanzarote in its 96 page preliminary report issued on Monday about the tragedy of Barajas. This absence surprises the pilots’ union (Sepla) and Pilots Association (COPAC).

The CIAIAC argues that “the circumstances are different and more relevant data and facts are different in both events” (Barajas and Lanzarote).

The international standard recommends that the report of the incident is completed in a year. Having missed the deadline, the conclusions of what happened in Lanzarote would come before the accident of Barajas. More than two years later, the case of Lanzarote still has no official explanation, but will soon. The committee also made recommendations to pilots and airlines, as it has done with Spanair.

The U.S. agency has incorporated, in just a few hours, three of the seven recommendations made by the CIAIAC on Monday. Washington said that after the accident in Detroit, they issued a recommendation that pilots check the TOWS before every flight (not the first flight of day). Boeing sent a telex to all companies to do so. Spanair, which did not exist in 1988, only requiring its pilots to review TOWS once a day.

It also endorsed the recommendation that TOWS becomes a fundamental system that cannot be shut down by a simple bug, and has an alarm that sounds if it is inactive if the aircraft tries to take off.

Above, the MD-83, Mapjet before takeoff without flaps on Lanzarote June 5, 2007. A pilot of another plane took the photo. Below, a similar aircraft with flaps deployed for takeoff. ULY MARTÍN